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KINDLE FORENSICS: ACQUISITION & ANALYSIS
Peter Hannay
SECAU
School of Computer and Security Science
Edith Cowan University
Perth, Australia
p.hannay@ecu.edu.au
ABSTRACT
The Amazon Kindle eBook reader supports a wide range of capabilities beyond reading books. This
functionality includes an inbuilt cellular data connection known as Whispernet. The Kindle provides
web browsing, an application framework, eBook delivery and other services over this connection. The
historic data left by user interaction with this device may be of forensic interest. Analysis of the
Amazon Kindle device has resulted in a method to reliably extract and interpret data from these
devices in a forensically complete manner.
Keywords: forensics, digital forensics, kindle, mobile, embedded, ebook, ereader
1. INTRODUCTION
The Amazon Kindle eBook reader provides significant functionality aside from that of simply reading
eBooks. As the Kindle is an embedded computing platform it is possible to deploy a wide range of
functionality due to the use of general computing hardware (see Table 1 for details). The Kindle
platform has grown to include a web browser, which utilizes an inbuilt cellular data connection, an
application framework, music player, image viewer, AGPS and numerous other capabilities. The
presence of this functionality leads to a situation where the ability to provide forensic analysis of these
devices would be quite desirable due to the potential for nefarious use of such features.
Table 1 - Comparison of Kindle Hardware (Amazon, 2010)

Flash
Comms

Kindle
Freescale
532 MHz,
ARM-11
256MB
Cellular/3G

Kindle Specifications
Kindle 2
Kindle DX
Freescale
Freescale
532 MHz,
532 MHz,
ARM-11
ARM-11
2GB
4GB
Cellular/3G
Cellular/3G

Kernel

Linux-2.6.26

Linux-2.6.26

CPU

Linux-2.6.26

Kindle DX 2
Freescale
532 MHz,
ARM-11
4GB
Cellular/3G
+ WiFI
Linux-2.6.26

Kindle 3
Freescale
532 MHz,
ARM-11
4GB
Cellular/3G
and/or WiFi
Linux-2.6.26

The 2GB of flash storage is divided into four file systems (see figure 1), the last of these is mapped to
act as a USB mass storage device and is the only file system that can be accessed, viewed or in any
other way interacted with when the kindle is in its secure state. The other three partitions contain the
root Linux file system, configuration files and a debug file system respectively.
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$ fdisk kindle.img
Disk: kindle
geometry: 995/64/63 [4014080 sectors]
Signature: 0xAA55
Starting
Ending
#: id cyl hd sec - cyl hd sec [
start size]
----------------------------------------------------------------------*1: 83
0
1
1 - 1023
3 16 [
16 819248]
Linux files*
2: 83 1023
3 16 - 1023
3 16 [
819264 49152]
Linux files*
3: 83 1023
3 16 - 1023
3 16 [
868416 16384]
Linux files*
4: 0B 1023
3 16 - 1023
3 16 [
884800 3129280]
Win95 FAT-32
Figure 1 - Partition Structure of the Kindle

Existing digital forensics software packages have implemented limited support for Kindle devices,
however there are is currently no support for examination of the flash memory other than the FAT32
partition (MacForensicsLab, 2010). In the same vein research has been performed by a number of
individuals in an attempt to derive forensic methodology for the Kindle, however this research has also
only focused on the FAT32 partition exposed as a USB mass storage device (Huber, 2010b; Hughes,
2010; newinforensics, 2010).
2. SECURITY
The Kindle utilizes a firmware update mechanism that allows for over the air (OTA) or manual
updates. In the case of both the update file is placed in the root of the mass storage portion of the file
system. The update is then applied once the user activates this functionality from the system menu of
the device.
The update files themselves are essentially signed TAR archives, these are extracted and a shell script
contained within executed to facilitate the update functionality. The signing mechanism relies on RSA
encryption in which the update is signed with amazon’s private key and verified with amazon’s public
key, which is pre-installed on the Kindle device (Hannay, 2010).
The security functionality can however be defeated as the tar archive is extracted prior to signature
verification. The most commonly employed exploit to leverage this involves setting the absolute path
to the public key store in the tar archive, as such prior to signature validation a new public key is
added to the store. The result of this exploit is that the ability to sign arbitrary updates is gained. The
jailbreak process described here is illustrated below in Figure 2.
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New Public
Key
Start Kindle Update Mechanism
Insert with path to /var/uks/name.pub

Hostile TAR Archive

Sign Update

Unpack Tar Archive

Add to update

Hostile TAR
unpacks to

Update File

Check signature
against keystore

/var/uks/

Update Success &
Hostile Key Installed

Figure 2 - Illustration of Jailbreak Process

3. ACQUISITION METHODOLOGY
Prior to commencement of this section it is important to note that knowledge of best practice in terms
of hashing, evidence preservation and documentation are assumed and as such are out of scope of this
paper. The investigator should ensure that he/she understands the impact that writing data to a device
can have and the implications on forensic integrity.
In order to accomplish the acquisition and analysis of the Kindle we must first gain access to the
device beyond what is available by default. This access is achieved through use of the exploit
identified in the previous section, the implementation we will be using in this example is the Kindle
Jailbreak (based on AVNard’s earlier work), this utility includes a standard public/private key pair
which is known publicly as well as an installation framework (NiLuJe, 2010). At this stage in the
process we now have the ability to install custom software via the update system.
In order to gain complete access to the device it is necessary to install some form of remote access
software on the device. In our case a telnet & SSH server will be installed along side scripts which
allow for the USB port to be remapped as a USB Ethernet Gadget. The package commonly used to
achieve this is the “USBNetwork” package, so named as it restores the USB networking functionality
that was originally present in early versions of the Kindle firmware (NiLuJe, 2010). Once this has
been accomplished it is possible to establish to start the USBNetwork service by issuing the
“;debugOn” and “`usbNetwork” commands on the device (without quotes) as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 - The “;debugOn” command being issued

Once the USBNetworking package is installed and enabled it is possible to start acquisition. This is
accomplished through the use of telnet, dd and netcat, this methodology has been commonly
implemented in live system acquisitions (Burdach, 2005). In this configuration the host system is
configured to listen for the data transmission, piping the output to dd. Then a telnet connection is
established to the kindle and data transfer initiated, this process is shown in Figure 4 below.

1. Connect to kindle
$ telnet 192.168.2.2
Trying 192.168.2.2...
Connected to 192.168.2.2.
Escape character is '^]'.
[root@kindle root]#
2. Listen for connection on host sytem
$ nc -l 55555 | dd of=kindle.img
3185454+1385484 records in
4014080+0 records out
2055208960 bytes transferred in 915.234125 secs (2245555
bytes/sec)
3. Initiate transfer of data from kindle
[root@kindle /dev]# dd if=/dev/mmcblk0 | nc 192.168.2.1 55555
4014080+0 records in
4014080+0 records out
Figure 4 - Acquiring image of NAND memory

Once this acquisition is complete it may be desirable to split this file into the four file systems that are
contained within. The details of these can be extracted using fdisk as shown in Figure 1. Once these
partition boundaries are known we can extract the individual partitions into their own files for
subsequent analysis as shown in Figure 5.
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$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep1.img skip=16 count=819248
819248+0 records in
819248+0 records out
419454976 bytes transferred in 23.742699 secs (17666693
bytes/sec)
$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep2.img skip=819264 count=49152
49152+0 records in
49152+0 records out
25165824 bytes transferred in 1.661936 secs (15142477
bytes/sec)
$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep3.img skip=868416 count=16384
16384+0 records in
16384+0 records out
8388608 bytes transferred in 0.315741 secs (26568018
bytes/sec)
$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep4.img skip=884800 count=3129280
3129280+0 records in
3129280+0 records out
1602191360 bytes transferred in 141.444850 secs (11327322
bytes/sec)
Figure 5 - Splitting disk image into individual partition images

The completion of this splitting leads us to the point where these images can be analysed using
traditional computer forensics methodologies. The next section includes information on the various
file systems and location of data that has been deemed to be of forensic interest.
4. DATA OF INTEREST

Partition 1 (root file system)
Location
/opt/wan/firmware/mt3/version.dat
/opt/amazon/ebook/config/
/opt/amazon/ebook/prefs/
/etc/uks/

Description
Firmware version indicator
Configuration files
Preferences files
Public key store, keys other amazon’s and the key created
during jailbreak may indicate tampering
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Partition 2 (/var/local)
Location
/audio/
/eink/screen_saver_last
/java/prefs/cookies
/java/prefs/DevicePasswordDa
ta.pw
/java/prefs/browser/bookmarks
/java/prefs/browser/cookie.dat

Description
Audio settings
The a reference to the last screen saver image displayed
Cookies used to uniquely identify this device to amazon.
These are persistent.
Password data for this device

Web browser bookmarks
Web browser cookies (no cache is present, this may
provide limited historical evidence of web access
/java/prefs/browser/settings
Web browser configuration
/java/prefs/com.amazon.ebook. Credentials and accounts associated with social networking
booklet.reader/socialservices (twitter, facebook, etc) that have been set up for
clipping/social-prefs
use with the device
/java/prefs/com.amazon.ebook. User settings including: country, timezone & WAN status
framework
/java/prefs
Details of the user, kindle name & user name
/log/
Detailed logs of users interaction with the device, including
time stamps
/wan/
Network configuration

Partition 4 (User file system – available via USB mass storage)
Location
/documents
/music
/system/Search Indexes/
/system/com.amazon.ebook.bo
oklet.reader/reader.pref

Description
Books and other publications for consumption on device
Music and other audio for consumption on device
History of each search conducted on the device
Contains details of last book read, font size selected and
dictionary currently in use.

Note: On all test systems partition 3 was zero filled. Based on investigation it has been determined that
this area is used for diagnostic purposes and likely will not contain information outside of the
development environment.
5. CONCLUSION
eBook devices such as the Kindle are gathering increased interest from the forensic community as they
become increasingly popular. The included cellular data capability of the Kindle specifically may
make it a candidate for nefarious purposes, as the there is no data cost associated with the global data
service (Hannay, 2010). In addition to data functionality the inclusion of an application framework and
development kit in beta release will only lead to increased use of the product for purposes that were
once met by the traditional computing paradigm.
The initial efforts of the forensic community have focused on acquisition of only a portion of the
internal storage of the device as this area is readily accessible as a USB mass storage device (Huber,
2010a, 2010b; Hughes, 2010; MacForensicsLab, 2010; newinforensics, 2010). This paper has gone
beyond the existing methodologies and provided a mechanism for the acquisition of the complete
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internal NAND memory and analysis of same. In order for this result to be achieved however some
data must be written to the device and in doing so there is the possibility of data being overwritten.
However aside from invasive hardware based acquisition there are no current known techniques that
would allow for complete acquisition without this approach.
Research into small and embedded device forensics is ongoing, with increased focus on complete
acquisition of all relevant data from these systems, including flash storage, memory and data stored on
individual microcontrollers.
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